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Abstract
High protection for agricultural commodities in the form of tariffs continues to be
the major factor restricting world trade. The large differences in average tariffs
across countries make it possible for farmers in one country to benefit from tariff
protection while farmers in other countries lose income because of lower prices
resulting from those tariffs. This report provides the first comprehensive analysis
of agricultural tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (limits on imported goods) across a
large number of countries and commodities and finds that high average tariffs cre-
ate barriers to markets for U.S. and other farmers.
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Summary
High protection for agricultural commodities in the form of tariffs continues to be
the major factor restricting world trade. The large differences in average tariffs
across countries make it possible for farmers in one country to benefit from tariff
protection while farmers in other countries lose income because of lower prices
resulting from those tariffs. This report provides the first comprehensive analysis
of agricultural tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (limits on imported goods) across a
large number of countries and commodities and finds that high average tariffs cre-
ate barriers to markets for U.S. and other farmers. 
Tariffs impose costs both in the country where they are applied and on other coun-
tries. Tariffs tax all products that cross a border, thus raising prices within the
country imposing the tariff. Higher prices affect suppy because farmers respond by
increasing output, and higher prices affect demand because consumers buy less.
The effects of tariffs on domestic markets can also spill over onto world markets as
the combined effect of more supply and less demand reduces imports. If the coun-
try imposing the tariff is a large importer, then world prices can fall. Thus, the case
against tariffs has two components: the distortions created within a country by
higher domestic prices and the costs imposed on other countries by lost export
sales and lower world prices.
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States and other World Trade
Organization (WTO) members began negotiations to reduce support and protection
in agriculture. These negotiations, which concluded in 1994, instituted tariffication,
which is the process of converting agricultural nontariff barriers (NTBs), such as
variable import levies and import quotas, into bound tariffs (tariffs set at estab-
lished rates). Tariffication resulted in a tariff-based system of border protection that
allowed for an initial set of tariff cuts. Countries were also to provide a minimum
level of import opportunities for products previously protected by NTBs. This was
accomplished by creating tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), which generally impose a rela-
tively low tariff (in-quota) on imports up to a specified level, with imports above
that level subject to a higher tariff (over-quota). 
In 2000, WTO members agreed to submit detailed proposals on how they plan to
further liberalize trade. These proposals include plans for negotiating the levels of
tariffs and TRQs, and for negotiating policies for domestic support and export sub-
sidies. Three questions need to be answered in order to understand how the alter-
native proposals may affect agricultural markets:
 What is the pattern of agricultural tariffs across countries?  Trade distortions
across countries contribute to shifts in global resources, potentially at the
expense of countries with a comparative advantage in agriculture. 
 How do tariffs vary across agricultural commodities? Large trade distortions
from high tariffs signal barriers to markets for competitive producers of spe-
cific commodities. 
 What does the structure of protection say about strategies in future trade negoti-
ations? For example, high tariffs for most agricultural commodities suggest the
need to include all commodities in negotiations to provide the most benefits. iv ✺ 		
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This report answers these questions and provides the first comprehensive analysis
of agricultural tariffs and TRQs across a large number of countries and commodi-
ties. This information can help U.S. policymakers, producers, and consumers
understand what is at stake in the ongoing WTO  negotiations. Key findings
include:
—High average tariffs characterize agricultural markets. The global average tariff
on agricultural products is 62 percent and is much higher than those on manufac-
tured items. From a global perspective, high average tariffs cause demand to con-
tract and supply to expand by drawing resources into agriculture, both leading to
lower world prices. 
—Average tariffs across 13 regions range from 25 to 113 percent, indicating that
farmers in some countries are protected at the expense of farmers in other coun-
tries. North America has the lowest regional tariff at 25 percent. Both developed
and developing countries employ high tariffs, although within each group, the
countries in the non-EU Western Europe and South Asia regions tend to apply
much higher tariffs than their counterparts. Thus tariffs have the potential to trans-
fer income from farmers in one country to those in another. 
— Average commodity tariffs range from 50 to 91 percent, with the highest tariffs
set for tobacco, meats, dairy, sugar, and sweeteners. Not only is protection high in
the dairy, sugar, and meat markets, but it is uniformly high across most countries.
This structure of high tariffs likely causes a significant drop in world prices. Thus,
multilateral liberalization could substantially increase world prices for these com-
modities. 
—The average tariff for the United States is 12 percent, among the lowest in the
world. With one of the lowest average tariffs, U.S. agriculture, as a whole, stands
to gain from ambitious cuts in tariffs. Like many developed countries, however, the
U.S. schedule contains some high tariffs aimed at protecting specific commodities.
—Agricultural tariffs in developing countries are considerably higher, on average,
than in developed countries. This, in part, reflects the special and differential treat-Economic Research Service/USDA 		
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ment provided to these countries, such as lower tariff reduction commitments. But,
available data suggest that many developing countries actually apply tariffs that are
considerably below the rates they agreed to in the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture. 
— TRQs are associated with high tariffs and sensitive sectors, as might be
expected from their relationship with products previously protected by nontariff
barriers. The average over-quota tariff of 128 percent is double the average for all
agricultural products. This results from the Uruguay Round tariffication process,
which allowed the conversion of some NTBs into very high tariffs. A number of
countries have bound their in-quota rates at extremely high levels, even though the
tariffication process called for the in-quota tariff to be set at a “low or minimal”
rate. The estimated average in-quota tariff of 63 percent is 1 percentage point
above the global average for all other tariffs. While no numerical rule defined “low
or minimal,” these rates would seem to contradict the spirit of the agreement, indi-
cating the need to negotiate some disciplines on these tariffs as well. 
—The presence of megatariffs, defined as tariffs of 100 percent or higher, across
all commodities and regions suggests the need to use a formula that reduces
higher tariffs at a greater rate. No imports are likely to enter under tariffs this
high, other than the minimum market access granted under a TRQ. In cases where
megatariffs are not associated with a TRQ, the only way to provide market access
will be to significantly cut tariffs.
— The complexity of many countries’tariff and TRQ schedules poses barriers to
understanding the nature of protection. The lack of transparency associated with
non-ad valorem tariffs hides the actual level of protection being provided. This is
particularly true of compound tariffs or those based on complex technical factors.
The result is difficulty in comparing protection across countries or commodities,
which hinders the process of negotiating tariff reductions. One of the goals of the
next negotiations might be to increase certainty and transparency by formulating
stricter rules on the submission of tariff and TRQ schedules. vi ✺ 		
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Glossary of Trade Terms
Agreement on Agriculture. Part of the Uruguay
Round agreement covering issues related to agricul-
ture—e.g., market access, export subsidies, and inter-
nal support.
Applied tariff rates. The actual tariff rate charged at
the border by an importing country, sometimes differ-
ing from the bound rate. The rate is allowable under
the rules of the WTO if it is at or below the bound
rate.
Articles (of the GATT). Clauses of the General Agree-
ment that lay out the rules and procedures that Con-
tracting Parties will observe in their conduct of inter-
national trade and trade policy. Each of the 38 Articles
in the GATT deals with a different aspect of trade.
Bound tariff rates. Tariff rates resulting from GATT
negotiations or accessions that are incorporated as part
of a country’s schedule of concessions. Bound rates
are enforceable under Article II of GATT. If a GATT
contracting party raises a tariff above the bound rate,
the affected countries have the right to retaliate against
an equivalent value of the offending country’s exports
or receive compensation, usually in the form of
reduced tariffs of other products they export to the
offending country.
Ceiling binding. In cases where an existing tariff was
not already bound, developing countries were allowed
to establish ceiling bindings. These ceiling bindings
could result in tariffs that were higher than the existing
applied rate. The ceiling bindings took effect on the
first day of implementation of the Agreement.
Country schedules. The official schedules of subsidy
commitments and tariff bindings as agreed to under
GATT for member countries.
EU (European Union). Established by the Treaty of
Rome in 1957 and known previously as the European
Economic Community and the Common Market. Orig-
inally composed of 6 European nations, it has
expanded to 15. The EU attempts to unify and inte-
grate member economies by establishing a customs
union and common economic policies, including CAP
(Common Agricultural Policy). Member nations
include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom.
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
Originally negotiated in Geneva, Switzerland in 1947
among 23 countries, including the United States,
GATT is an agreement to increase international trade
by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. The agree-
ment provides a code of conduct for international com-
merce and a framework for periodic multilateral nego-
tiations on trade liberalization and expansion.
In-quota tariff. The tariff applied on imports within
the quota. The in-quota tariff is less than the over-
quota tariff. 
Market access. The extent to which a country permits
imports. A variety of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers
can be used to limit the entry of foreign products. 
Megatariffs. Extremely high tariffs that effectively cut
off all imports other than the minimum access amounts
granted under the agreement. Some well-known exam-
ples of megatariffs resulting from tariffication include
the base tariffs calculated for EU tariffs on grains,
sugar and dairy products; U.S. sugar, peanuts and
dairy products; Canadian tariffs on dairy products and
poultry; and Japanese tariffs on wheat, peanuts and
dairy products. 
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status. An agreement
between countries to extend the same trading privi-
leges to each other that they extend to any other coun-
try. Under a most-favored-nation agreement, for exam-
ple, a country will extend to another country the low-
est tariff rates it applies to any third country. A country
is under no obligation to extend MFN treatment to
another country, unless they are both members of the
WTO, or unless MFN is specified in an agreement
between them. 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). A
trade agreement involving Canada, Mexico, and the
U.S., implemented on January 1, 1994, with a 15-year
transition period. The major agricultural provisions of
NAFTA include: 1) the elimination of non-tariff barri-
ers—immediately upon implementation, generally
through their conversion to tariff-rate quotas or ordi-
nary quotas; 2) elimination of tariffs—many immedi-
ately, most within 10 years, and some sensitive 
products gradually over 15 years; 3) special safeguard
provisions; and 4) country-of-origin rules to ensureEconomic Research Service/USDA 		
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that Mexico does not serve as a platform for exports
from third countries to the United States.
Non-tariff trade barriers. Regulations used by govern-
ments to restrict imports from, and exports to, other
countries, including embargoes, import quotas, and
technical barriers to trade. 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development). An organization founded in 1961 to
promote economic growth, employment, a rising stan-
dard of living, and financial stability; to assist the eco-
nomic expansion of member and nonmember develop-
ing countries; and to expand world trade. The member
countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lux-
embourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.
Over-quota tariff. The tariff applied on imports in
excess of the quota volume. The over-quota tariff is
greater than the in-quota tariff. 
Round. Refers to one of a series of multilateral trade
negotiations held under the auspices of the GATT for
the purposes of reducing tariffs or other trade barriers.
There have been eight trade negotiating rounds since
the adoption of the GATT in 1947.
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. Techni-
cal barriers designed for the protection of human
health or the control of animal and plant pests and 
diseases.
Tariff. A tax imposed on commodity imports by a gov-
ernment. A tariff may be a fixed charge per unit of
product imported (specific tariff), a fixed percentage of
value (ad valorem tariff), or some combination of both.
Tariff-rate quota. Quantitative limit (quota) on
imported goods, above which a higher tariff rate is
applied. A lower tariff rate applies to any imports
below the quota amount.
Tariffication. The process of converting non-tariff
trade barriers to bound tariffs. This is done under the
UR agreement in order to improve the transparency of
existing agricultural trade barriers and facilitate their
proposed reduction. 
UR (Uruguay Round) agreement. The Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, conducted
under the auspices of the GATT, is a trade agreement
designed to open world markets. The Agreement on
Agriculture is one of the 29 individual legal texts
included in the Final Act under an umbrella agreement
establishing the WTO. The negotiation began at Punta
del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986 and concluded
in Marrakesh, Morocco, in April 1994.
World Trade Organization (WTO). Established on
January 1, 1995, as a result of the Uruguay Round, the
WTO replaces GATT as the legal and institutional
foundation of the multilateral trading system of mem-
ber countries. It provides the principal contractual
obligations determining how governments frame and
implement domestic trade legislation and regulations.
And it is the platform on which trade relations among
countries evolve through collective debate, negotiation,
and adjudication.viii ✺ 		
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Introduction
High protection for agricultural commodities contin-
ues to be the major distorting feature of international
trade. The global average agricultural tariff,1 esti-
mated at 62 percent, contrasts with the much lower
tariffs for industrial products estimated by Hertel and
Martin (see references). Not only are some agricul-
tural tariffs extremely high, but they are also highly
uneven across countries and commodities. Clearly,
substantial room exists for liberalization of agricul-
tural tariffs.
Among the most important accomplishments of the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA)
was the requirement to convert agricultural nontariff
barriers (NTBs), such as variable import levies and im-
port quotas, into bound tariffs. Bound tariffs are set at
rates established by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) negotiations. The process, known
as tariffication, resulted in a tariff-based system of bor-
der protection that allowed for an initial set of tariff
cuts in the URAA. Developed countries agreed to re-
duce all agricultural tariffs from their base period rates
by a total of 36 percent, on a simple average basis,
with a minimum cut of 15 percent for each tariff.2
Starting in 1995, tariff cuts were to take place in equal
installments over 6 years for developed countries and
10 years for developing countries. Countries were also
to provide a minimum level of import opportunities for
products previously protected by NTBs. This was
accomplished by creating tariff-rate quotas (TRQs),
which generally impose a relatively low tariff (in-
quota) on imports up to a specified level, with imports
above that level subject to a higher tariff (over-quota). 
The high tariffs currently existing in the agricultural
sector restrict trade in agricultural products and cause
world prices to fall. Research conducted by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Ser-
vice (ERS) has shown that tariffs and associated TRQs
account for the largest share of global agricultural dis-
tortions. Export subsidies and domestic farm programs
are the other major distortions. When all three types of
distorting policies are removed, world prices increase
by 12 percent. Tariffs account for 52 percent of the
increase in world prices (Burfisher et al). While reduc-
ing tariffs is a necessary part of increasing market
access, other impediments to trade may also need to be
addressed. For example, factors such as sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) measures or state trading enter-
prises may also limit market access. 
This report addresses three questions about tariffs that
are relevant for future negotiations on market access. 
 What is the pattern of agricultural tariffs across
countries? Distortions across countries contribute to
shifts in global resources, potentially at the expense
of countries with a comparative advantage in agri-
culture. Figure 1 shows the landscape of global tar-
iffs. Disparities in tariffs indicate that some coun-
tries protect their agricultural sectors at the expense
of other countries. Leveling the playing field across
countries would help alleviate this problem. 
 How do tariffs vary across agricultural commodi-
ties? Global average tariffs range from 50 to 91 per-
cent for the 46 commodity groups analyzed in this
report. Large distortions from high tariffs signal bar-
riers to markets for competitive producers of spe-
cific commodities. 
Profiles of Tariffs in Global 
Agricultural Markets
Paul Gibson, John Wainio, Daniel Whitley, and Mary Bohman
1 In this report, the term “tariff” refers to the import duties that
WTO members may levy on imports from other members (bound
MFN tariffs based on final URAA implementation).
2 Developing countries were required to reduce their tariffs on aver-
age by only 24 percent, with a minimum cut of 10 percent for each
tariff. However, in the case of previously unbound tariffs or when
converting NTBs to tariffs, many developing countries chose the
option of offering tariff bindings with no reduction in tariff levels.
Least developed countries were not required to reduce their tariffs,
although they still had to replace their NTBs with tariffs and bind
all tariffs.2 ✺ 		
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 What does the structure of protection say about
strategies in future trade negotiations?  In particular,
in what countries do high tariffs exist for commodi-
ties and food products of interest to the United
States?  
By answering the three questions above, this report
paints a picture of the current pattern of market access
protection for agriculture. It begins with an economic
perspective of the ways that tariffs affect markets, fol-
lowed by the methodology behind the indicators of tar-
iff impacts, and then compares different types of tar-
iffs. The heart of the report identifies patterns in global
tariff and TRQ profiles across countries and commodi-
ties. The report then digs deeper into the structure of
protection for the three major agricultural players in
global markets, the United States, the European Union
(EU), and Japan. An overview of protection for com-
modities of interest to the United States concludes 
the analysis.






100  -  200%
  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
Source:  Economic Research Service, USDA
1
1Economic Research Service/USDA 		
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Why Tariffs Matter
Tariffs impose a cost on all products that cross a bor-
der, thus raising prices within the country that imposes
the tariff. Higher prices affect supplies as farmers
respond by increasing output and affect demand as
consumers buy less. Countries apply tariffs primarily
to protect domestic industries. This and other justifica-
tions for tariffs are discussed in the box, Why Coun-
tries Use Tariffs. The domestic market effects of tariffs
can also spill over onto world markets as the combined
effect of more supply and less demand reduces
imports. If the country imposing the tariff is a large
importer, then world prices can fall. Thus, the case
against tariffs has two components: the distortions
created within the country via higher domestic prices
and the costs imposed on other countries via lost
export sales and lower world prices. 
Table 1 shows how tariffs affect different parts of the
agricultural economy for three categories of countries:
the tariff-imposing country, exporting countries, and
importing countries. The effects are shown for the final
consumption and the product as an input or intermedi-
ate good. For simplicity, the analysis focuses on a sin-
gle commodity, durum wheat, and two final products,
pasta and bread. 
The country imposing the tariff in table 1 realizes a
drop in net economic benefits. This loss of overall eco-
nomic benefits comes from two sources. First, a higher
domestic price draws resources into wheat farming,
instead of other agricultural and nonagricultural uses,
that might have created more value elsewhere. For
example, capital and labor used to produce extra wheat
might be more productive elsewhere, such as produc-
ing alternative crops or information technology. Sec-
ond, higher wheat prices alter consumer choice and
lower real income. 
While tariffs increase prices in the imposing country,
they can also lower world market prices. Producers in
all other countries suffer from lower prices. Thus,
while tariffs in one country may be seen as protecting
its domestic wheat farmers, those same tariffs penalize
wheat farmers in other countries. The high level of,
and differences in, tariffs across countries shown in
figure 1 indicate that current protection levels shift
wealth across national borders. 
The higher consumer price extends to industries that
use the product, such as manufacturers that use wheat
in pasta production. For example, tariffs that increase
the price of wheat for domestic pasta manufacturers
could decrease the price for foreign pasta makers. The
higher wheat price raises costs for domestic pasta
makers and puts them at a disadvantage to foreign
companies in both the domestic and foreign markets. 
Table 1 focuses on one commodity, but the costs and
benefits from a single tariff can spill over to other
commodities as well. As stated earlier, tariffs can draw
resources away from the production of other com-
modities within a country. They can also alter produc-
tion and consumption decisions in other countries.
Lower international wheat prices could cause farmers
in other countries to plant alternative crops such as
barley or rapeseed, leading to an increase in their sup-
ply and a resulting fall in world price. By altering
prices, tariffs alter economic incentives, which can sig-
nificantly affect how efficiently economies use their
resources. In general, one might expect that the more
complex a country’s tariff schedule, the less likely that
any single component will have the intended effect.
To summarize, tariffs are a tool to protect domestic
industries. They transfer income from consumers to
producers and across the value-added chain. Tariffs
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First, they decrease overall wealth by distorting pro-
duction and consumption. These distortions can filter
down to prices of land and other inputs primarily used
in agriculture. Second, tariffs in one country hurt farm-
ers in other countries and benefit foreign consumers.
Additional spillover effects across countries include
changes in other countries’ balance of payments
through changes in export or tariff revenue and 
import costs. 
Providing protection against competition from imports
for a specific commodity or sector is the most com-
mon reason countries apply tariffs. Underlying this
reason, however, is the old mercantilist notion that a
country is better off if it exports more than it imports
and that, therefore, protective tariffs will add to the
nation’s prosperity. One of modern economics’great-
est contributions has been to point out the fallacy of
the mercantilist argument by demonstrating the econo-
mywide benefits from free trade. 
But, the economic case against tariffs, which exposes
the distribution of costs and benefits to the economy,
also helps to explain why those who benefit from tar-
iffs continue to lobby ardently for protection. The
costs, in the form of higher consumer prices, are
spread out over a large number of consumers. How-
ever, the benefits are concentrated on a relatively
small group of producers of the product. Any change
in tariffs simply means more to the average producer
than to the average consumer. 
Several reasons are commonly used to justify apply-
ing tariffs. In agriculture, concern about farm income
as well as nonmarket benefits from agriculture (e.g.,
benefits from agricultural landscapes) provide ration-
ale for farm programs that often include tariffs as a
policy instrument. Tariff protection is often an inte-
gral and essential element of a country’s domestic
agricultural policy and can only be eliminated if
accompanied by changes in domestic regimes. In
particular, programs designed to raise domestic
prices above world prices may be unsustainable in
the face of increased imports. While providing pro-
tection to producers, tariffs also raise consumer
prices and create more distortions than direct support
for producers. Therefore, economists find that poli-
cies that directly target the policy objective, such as
income transfers to address low incomes, are more
effective policy instruments than tariffs (Corden). 
Some justifications for tariffs relate to current market
conditions. Temporary use of tariffs has been justi-
fied in order to protect new or infant industries and
to provide a window to become established in the
market. In practice, however, these tariffs prove diffi-
cult to remove, as those that benefit come to rely on
the protection they provide. Under specific circum-
stances, tariffs can be introduced or raised even when
they are bound at zero or have low rates. For exam-
ple, the WTO allows members to apply anti-dumping
(AD), countervailing (CVD), or special safeguard
(SSG) duties (and, in the case of safeguards, import
quotas). CVDs are sometimes applied to offset subsi-
dies by other countries, while ADs are applied when
foreign firms sell  products below costs. SSGs can be
imposed if a country experiences an increase in the
volume of imports or a drop in the price of imports
which exceed certain trigger levels. Tariffs applied
for these three reasons represent an extremely small,
but growing share of all tariffs, and WTO rules pro-
vide guidelines for their application. 
Governments in developing countries sometimes
apply tariffs to achieve other objectives. The relative
ease of taxing goods at international borders com-
pared to levying income or sales taxes makes tariffs
an attractive source of revenue. Managing the bal-
ance of payments by restricting imports is another
rationale developing countries use to apply tariffs. 
Why Countries Use TariffsEconomic Research Service/USDA 		
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Methodology for Developing
Tariff Profiles
Countries levy tariffs in a number of different, and
sometimes complex, forms. Most tariffs are expressed
in “ad valorem” terms, or as a percentage of the value
of the imported good. However, a significant portion is
expressed in specific, or other non-ad valorem terms
(see box, Tariff Formats Conceal High Levels of Pro-
tection). Agriculture is somewhat unique in the extent
to which non-ad valorem tariffs are still used. In the
United States and the EU, for example, approximately
44 percent of agricultural tariff-lines (categories of
products with tariffs) are specified in non-ad valorem
terms. There are a number of reasons for this, includ-
ing the increased protection that a non-ad valorem tax
can provide against large drops in import prices and
the lack of transparency associated with these rates,
which helps conceal the level of protection being 
provided. 
Tariffs are bound at the tariff-line level, which refers to
the category to which the legally established tariff
applies. The complexity of many schedules and the
lack of transparency associated with this complexity
make it very difficult to compare tariffs across coun-
tries or across commodity markets. The challenge in
making the comparisons is to transform the data to a
common basis and then develop measures to summa-
rize the thousands of tariff-lines that can make up a
schedule. This section describes the conceptual
approach used to develop meaningful tariff profiles for
each country. The steps are presented following the
same process we used to transform the tariff-lines into
statistics that characterize each country’s tariff sched-
ule. Appendix A provides technical details on 
these calculations.
Calculation of Tariff Ad Valorem Equivalents
The first step in developing tariff profiles is to calcu-
late an ad valorem equivalent (AVE) for each non-ad
valorem tariff. Unfortunately, no single AVE exists for
non-ad valorem tariffs, as the calculated value depends
on the choice of import price and exchange rate, both
of which can change over time. The import price
should approximate the declared value against which
the ad valorem tariff would have been charged.
Domestic prices overstate this value because they have
been inflated by the tariff, while the country-specific
import unit values reflect preferential import condi-
tions and, thus, can be out of line with representative
world prices and vary widely across countries (Lind-
Countries levy tariffs in a number of different
ways:
 As a percentage of the value of imports (ad val-
orem tariffs)
 As a monetary amount per unit of import such
as cents per liter (specific tariffs)
 As a combination of the two, such as 12.5 per-
cent plus 2 cents per liter (compound tariffs)
Other factors can further complicate compound 
tariffs, including appending a threshold, such as, but
not less than 15 cents per liter or greater than 25
cents per liter. In this case, either the ad valorem or
the specific portion of the tariff can be binding. Tar-
iffs may also vary based on the time of year (sea-
sonal tariffs) or be determined by complex technical
factors (such as sugar or alcohol content).
One of the main rationales for specific duties is
their administrative simplicity, since they avoid the
problem of having to value imports. Defenders of
specific tariffs have argued that ad valorem rates
give an incentive to importers to underinvoice,
since the size of the duty depends on the price of
the import. Supporters of ad valorem rates have
countered that specific duties place a heavier bur-
den on lower priced items within a given tariff-
line and are therefore a regressive tax on con-
sumers. In addition, they point to the lack of trans-
parency associated with specific duties, since the
ad valorem equivalent is often difficult to deter-
mine (Irwin).
Since calculating AVEs takes considerable time
and effort, and since the data needed to perform
such calculations are often not available, non-ad
valorem tariffs for agriculture are often excluded
from calculations of average tariffs. This can result
in an average that is underestimated, since the
AVE of these tariffs tends to be quite high. Based
on the AVEs calculated in this study, non-ad val-
orem tariffs appear to provide significantly higher
tariff protection than ad valorem tariffs. The aver-
age of bound tariffs specified solely in ad valorem
terms is 58 percent, while the average AVE of
non-ad valorem tariffs is 123 percent. 
Tariff Formats Conceal High 
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land). In many cases, no country-specific import value
even exists, particularly when tariffs are so high as to
preclude any trade from taking place. Representative
world prices also present a problem since they may not
conform to the specific quality or variety of the com-
modity imported. 
In this study, world import unit values were used as a
proxy for import prices, since the global perspective
corrects for individual country tariffs and represents
the average quality or variety of the product in ques-
tion. This approach also allowed us to calculate AVEs
even when the country imported none of the commod-
ity in question. Unfortunately, world import unit val-
ues present a drawback as well, since they are only
available at the relatively aggregate levels. When coun-
tries have many disaggregated tariff-lines, using the
world unit import value may underestimate the AVE
for some of these tariffs and overestimate it for others.
One characteristic of fixed, specific tariffs is that they
provide a level of protection inversely related to prices.
Therefore, in a time of low prices, the level of protec-
tion provided by the tariff is higher than during a
period of high prices. Likewise, when tariffs are
denominated in domestic currencies while prices are in
U.S. dollars, a depreciation in the exchange rate will
result in a decrease in the AVE, even if the specific tar-
iff and the dollar price have not changed. Thus, the
AVE will vary based on the time period of the world
import unit value used in the calculation. Prices used
to calculate AVEs in this report are based on average
world import unit values for 1995-97. To the extent
that world import prices during this period reflect
somewhat higher world prices than prevailed at other
times, the AVE tariffs presented here will be lower
than AVEs calculated during a period of lower prices,
such as current prices. 
Country and Commodity Coverage
In order to identify patterns in protection, the next step
is to aggregate the tariffs for extremely narrowly defined
products (a total of 91,000 tariffs across all countries)
into broad country and commodity categories. The next
section uses regional aggregations to provide a broad
overview of the differences in tariff protection. Country
coverage of the data used includes 129 of 140 WTO
members.3 Commodity or product groupings used in
this report cover a broad range of agricultural products
traded by both developed and developing countries. The
commodity list used in this report covers most, but not
all of the lines that fall under the WTO definition of
agriculture (see Appendix).4
The most common way to aggregate tariffs, used in
this study, is to calculate the simple, unweighted aver-
age. However, drawbacks are associated with a simple
average. An unweighted average does not distinguish
between “important” and “unimportant” tariffs. Since
equal weight is given to all agricultural tariffs, a
kumquat tariff is as important as a wheat tariff, if each
enters as a single tariff-line item. The different levels
of commodity aggregation found in each country’s 
tariff schedule present another drawback. For instance,
in the category “dairy,” there are 27 tariff-lines for
Australia, 75 for Canada, 183 for the United States,
and 187 for the EU. If tariffs for these items are 
large (which they are), the higher the level of disaggre-
gation, the greater the upward bias in the country 
average. 
There are a number of alternative ways to average and
aggregate tariffs across countries and commodities,
none of which is without bias. Weighted averages are
often calculated in an attempt to emphasize certain tar-
iffs over others. Weighting based on import values,
perhaps the most commonly used weighting scheme,
may bias the average downward, because items with
the highest tariffs will receive virtually no weight
because little or no trade will take place under such
tariffs. Weighting based on shares of domestic value of
production would assure that highly protected com-
modities produced in large amounts get appropriately
large weights, but this method can result in an upward
bias, because many factors other than tariffs affect
agricultural production levels. In addition, production
data at the tariff-line level are rarely available. The
share of the domestic value of consumption is another
alternative, but biased to the extent that high tariffs
reduce consumption. Similar to production, consump-
tion data are generally not available at the tariff-line
level. One alternative is to calculate a simple
(unweighted) average aggregated to a level where data
on appropriate production weights are available (the 4-
or 6-digit HS level), as was done by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in a recent analysis (OECD, 1999). Ultimately, there is
4 A detailed specification of commodity groupings is available
from the authors (pgibson@ers.usda.gov).
3 As of November 30, 2000, WTO membership totaled 140 coun-
tries or customs territories. Of this number, 16 are accounted for by
the European Union; one each for the EU Commission and the 15
member states. no ideal weighting scheme and the transparency of
unweighted aggregations has some advantages. 
Statistics To Characterize Tariff Profiles 
A critical component of this study is to determine
appropriate statistical measures to characterize the
level of tariff protection in each country or commodity
sector. The two most commonly used measures are the
arithmetic mean (or average) to capture the overall
level of tariffs and the standard deviation to measure
the spread or distance of most observations from the
mean. While each is the most efficient measure for
normal or bell-shaped distributions, arithmetic mean
and standard deviation are not the most appropriate
measure for highly skewed distributions.5
Tariff schedules sometimes have distributions that are
highly skewed to the right, meaning that the tariffs
continue much farther to the right of the mean than to
the left. For these distributions, the mean may overesti-
mate the central tendency of the data. The most com-
mon alternative measure is the tariff median, which
measures the midpoint of the tariff schedule’s distribu-
tion. If a country’s tariff schedule is normally distrib-
uted, then the mean and median tariffs would be very
close, and there would be no need to report more than
one. But, when the tariff schedule is highly skewed,
both the mean and median give useful information,
although the median tariff might be considered a more
“representative” measure for comparing the overall
height of each country’s regime, since it is less sensi-
tive to a few extremely high rates.6
This report uses means and medians as the two statis-
tics to characterize tariff distributions. While the rela-
tionship between the mean and median represents a
continuum, four benchmark combinations are identi-
fied with associated economic interpretations.
High mean/high median: High levels of protection for
a country or commodity sector found across most tar-
iff-lines.
High mean/low median: Extremely high levels of pro-
tection for a few specific commodities result in high
mean, although most tariff-lines are low. This suggests
the need for more detailed analysis that breaks out
countries and/or disaggregates commodities to under-
stand nature of protection.
Low mean/high median: Extremely low levels of pro-
tection for a few specific commodities result in low
mean, although most tariff-lines are high. This sug-
gests the need for more detailed analysis that breaks
out countries and/or disaggregates commodities to
understand the nature of protection.
Low mean/low median: Low levels of protection for 
a country or commodity sector found across most 
tariff-lines.
Before applying these benchmarks to the data, defi-
nitions of high and low are required. The dividing
lines are the global mean agricultural tariff equal to 
62 percent and the global median tariff equal to 40
percent. In parts of the analysis, tariffs for a specific
Economic Research Service/USDA 		
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5 When the word “mean” is used without a modifier, it refers to the
arithmetic mean, or simple average.
6 This report does not provide a direct measure of the spread or dis-
persion of the data such as the standard deviation. A comparison of
the mean and median provides some information about the disper-
sion and also indicates the influence of megatariffs.
A number of sources provide the bound and
applied data used in this report. The primary
source of bound tariffs is the Agricultural Market
Access Database (AMAD). The AMAD is the
most comprehensive collection of available public
data on WTO market access, containing detailed
data on WTO tariff and TRQ schedules, import
data, applied tariffs, production, consumption,
and trade, among other information. The AMAD
contains data on about 40 WTO members, includ-
ing all major agricultural trading members.
AMAD data can be accessed through its website,
www.amad.org. Tariff bindings in this report for
countries not included in the AMAD are from tar-
iff bindings of the WTO Secretariat. These bind-
ings are reproduced on the CD-ROM “Results of
the Uruguay Round,” WTO Secretariat. Additional
data on applied tariffs is from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) Trade Analysis and Information System
(TRAINS) database. UNCTAD TRAINS contains
a comprehensive collection of applied tariff data.
Applied tariff data for developing countries for the
years 1995-99 included in this analysis, as well as
in the AMAD, are from the UNCTAD TRAINS
database.
Tariff Data8 ✺ 		
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commodity and country are also compared with
regional or commodity mean and median tariffs. 
This study also identifies markets subject to extremely
high tariffs. This is important because these are mar-
kets where tariffs could be significantly reduced with-
out actually improving market access. No internation-
ally accepted definition exists to categorize these
“megatariffs.” In this report, tariffs equal to or above
100 percent qualify as megatariffs. Another term for
megatariffs used in this study is “international tariff
peaks,” or those tariff-lines that exceed some common
yardstick. 7
The levels of tariff protection profiled in this report
refer to Most Favored Nation (MFN) bound tariffs.
Tariff rates on trade under regional or preferential trade
provisions, such as North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) or Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), are not considered. 
Bound MFN tariffs are tariff commitments sched-
uled by WTO members and are generally considered
the maximum allowable tariffs that a member may
levy on imports. The establishment of bound tariff
rates on agricultural trade among WTO members
was a major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round.
Under WTO rules, application of tariffs above bound
rates generally requires that compensation be offered
to trading partners adversely affected by an increase
in tariffs above bound levels. Bound MFN tariffs are
the rate against which regional tariff preferences or
other import reductions are referenced. Bound rates
have typically been the rate used as the basis for tar-
iff reductions in multilateral trade negotiations. The
tariff schedules of most WTO members reflect the
tariff rates established by the Uruguay Round. Tariff
schedules of members who joined the WTO since
1995 were developed through accession negotiations.
In general, these bindings reflect the rate effective
for 2000 and beyond for developed countries and
2004 and beyond for developing countries, although
all ceiling bindings took effect in 1995.
Some tariffs take the form of tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs). TRQs specify that a limited quantity of a
good may be imported at a low tariff, the  “in-quota”
tariff. Once the quota level has been reached, unlimited
imports of the same good may be imported at a higher
“over-quota” tariff. Prior to the Uruguay Round, many
WTO members applied a wide range of nontariff barri-
ers (NTBs) on imports of agricultural products. The
Uruguay Round replaced NTBs with tariff-rate quotas;
a process also known as tariffication. The tariffication
process provided for two types of TRQs: minimum
access and current access. The minimum access level
is the quantity allowed to be imported at the lower tar-
iff. It was set at 3 percent of consumption in 1986-88
in the base period, to be increased to 5 percent of base
consumption by 2000 (2004 for developing countries).
Current access was to be provided for products subject
to tariffication with imports exceeding 5 percent of
domestic consumption in the base period.
Although all WTO members established bound 
tariffs in the Uruguay Round, the actual applied tariff
that a country imposes may be lower than the tariff
binding. Unlike bound tariffs, applied tariffs may 
be raised above published levels (up to bound rates)
without notice or compensation to affected trade 
partners. A comprehensive database of applied tariff
data across WTO members is not readily available.
However, a subset of applied tariff data for several
developing countries from the AMAD and UNCTAD
TRAINS databases was collected for this report. The
data are used to illustrate the differences that may 
be observed between bound and applied rates in some
countries.
Bound Tariffs,TRQ Tariffs, and Applied Tariffs: What’s the Difference?
7 The WTO often uses the term “international tariff peaks” to refer
to tariffs above 15 percent. This definition has generally been used
when examining tariffs on imports of manufactures. For agricul-
tural tariffs, however, defining international peaks as tariffs equal to
or above 100 percent has more meaning. Tariff Profiles by Region and
Commodity
This section compares bound tariffs (see box, Bound
Tariffs, TRQ Tariffs, and Applied Tariffs: What’s the
Difference? for information on different types of tar-
iffs) on agricultural commodities across regional and
commodity groupings. The tariff means and medians
presented in this report are useful measures to compare
the potential levels of protection built into countries’
tariff schedules. However, differences between bound
and applied tariffs, market conditions, and other 
policies also influence the actual barrier to market
access.8
Tariffs by Region
Against a high global average tariff rate of 62 percent,
considerable variation exists in tariff levels across
regions. Average tariffs for WTO members by region
range from an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 25 per-
cent to 113 percent (figure 2). By region, average 
tariffs in agriculture are over 100 percent in two 
regions: South Asia (113 percent) and the non-EU
countries of Western Europe (104 percent). At 25 per-
cent, North America registered the lowest regional tar-
iff average. 
Table 2 displays mean and median tariffs, by regional
grouping, for each of the commodity aggregates. 
For most of the developed country groupings, the
regional tariff aggregates are among the lowest
regional averages. The main exceptions to this trend
are the non-EU countries of Western Europe, which
include Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. Each of
these has relatively high average tariffs, at 142, 120,
and 113 percent, respectively. Like North America, the
EU-15 also registers a relatively low average regional
tariff, at 30 percent. 
Economic Research Service/USDA 		
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8 The issue of “water in the tariff,” or the condition where a coun-
try’s domestic price is below the import price plus the tariff, is an
example of how market conditions help determine the actual level
of protection. State trading enterprises and sanitary and phytosani-
tary (SPS) measures are examples of policies that can raise the
actual level of import protection.























Average agricultural tariff (62 percent)
1
  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
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The average tariff of the Asia-Pacific region of 34 per-
cent conceals a wide range of country averages. Aver-
age tariffs of 10 percent or less are registered for Sin-
gapore, Hong Kong, Macau, Australia, and New
Zealand. However, tariffs for Japan and Korea average
58 percent and 66 percent, respectively. Most of the
remaining countries in the region maintain tariffs of 25
to 45 percent.
With the exception of the high tariff region of non-EU
Western Europe, the regional groupings with the high-
est average tariffs are regions that comprise non-
OECD countries. The developing country regions of
Africa, the Caribbean, and South Asia, with averages
ranging from 71 to 113 percent, are all above the
global average rate of 62 percent. The regions of South
America, the Middle East, and Central America all
have tariff averages ranging from 39 to 54 percent. 
Within most regional groups, the tariff means across
commodity groupings tend to show a high degree of
variation. In the three European regional groupings, as
well as in North America, North Africa, and the Asia-
Pacific region, there is a high dispersion rate across
commodity means. In particular, tariffs greater than the
overall average tariff on agriculture of 62 percent are
found in the meat, dairy, sugar, and sweetener cate-
gories. In addition, in some regions, comparatively
high tariffs are recorded for tobacco, oils, and several
categories of prepared vegetables. 
In a few regions, tariffs tend to be rather uniform, with
average rates across commodity groups varying little
from the regional averages. The average rate of 75 per-
cent found across all commodities in Sub-Saharan
Africa, for example, reflects the fact that each country
in the region set a uniform tariff rate across the 
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  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
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entirety of its agricultural tariff schedule. While these
uniform rates differ by country, when averaged across
commodity groupings, the mean tariffs are identical
for each. In South Asia, Central America, and 
South America, mean tariffs across the commodity
groupings are also relatively close to the overall
regional averages. 
Tariffs by Commodity
Figure 3 compares average tariffs by commodity group
for all WTO members reviewed in this report. Of the
46 commodity aggregates listed, average tariffs on 18
of the groups are above the global agricultural tariff
rate of 62 percent. These commodity groups are made
up of tobacco, dairy, meats, sugar, sweeteners, several
categories of vegetables, grains, grain products, and
breeding animals. Tariffs on the remaining 28 com-
modity groups are at or below the 62-percent average
tariff. At rates of more than 50 percent, commodity
groups with the lowest tariffs (coffee, fiber, several
fruit categories, spices, and live horticulture), are nev-
ertheless all relatively high. These high global tariff
rates across all commodity groupings reflect the high
tariffs found in many developing countries’WTO
schedules.
Table 2 also reveals regional patterns in tariff protec-
tion by commodity. For North America and the EU,
tariffs on most of the commodity groups are below
each region’s respective average tariff. Commodities
with tariffs below regional means in both the EU and
North America include live breeding animals, coffee,
fiber, fruit, nuts, oilseeds and oilcake, skins and hides,
spices, tea, and vegetables. Unmanufactured tobacco in
the Asia-Pacific region and sweeteners in North Africa
have the highest tariffs for any commodity category in
the respective regions. 



















  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
Source:  Economic Research Service, USDA
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Means and Medians across 
Commodities and Regions
Several patterns emerge from comparing means and
medians across the regional and commodity averages.
Figure 4 plots all the entries in table 2 where the mean
falls within 200 percent (this excludes only eight
regional-commodity points). The mean is on the hori-
zontal axis and the median is on the vertical axis. The
global mean and median are marked with solid lines.
They divide the figure into four quadrants that corre-
spond to the categories presented in the methodology
section, e.g., low mean/low median in the lower left-
hand corner, high mean/high median in the upper
right-hand corner. The dashed line at a 45-degree angle
shows where the mean equals the median.
Several observations from figure 4 help characterize
the global pattern of protection. First, most tariffs lie
below the 45-degree line, indicating that high tariffs on
a few specific lines are one cause of high overall aver-
ages. This is also reflected in a global median of 40
percent that lies below the global mean. The distance
below the 45-degree line is an indicator of the magni-
tude of the influence of megatariffs on the mean value.
For example, the point with a mean of 87 and a
median of 70 represents EU dairy and shows that tar-
iffs are high across most specific products. In contrast,
the point 88, 26 represents Eastern Europe vegetable
Low tariffs in North America
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  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
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juice (tomato) and indicates that a few, very high tar-
iffs distort the average. 
The large number of tariffs in the low mean/low
median category indicate that the majority of commod-
ity averages for these regions lie below the global
average. A comparison with the global average manu-
facturing tariff of 5 percent (Hertel and Martin) makes
the point that all but a very few regional, commodity
pairs lie above this average. Although relatively
smaller in number, the scatter plot shows that a signifi-
cant number of commodity groups across regions have
high and likely prohibitive tariffs. Thus, the problem
of high tariffs is not isolated in a small number of
countries and commodities. 
Figures 5a-5d show how scatter plots of means and
medians can help uncover patterns of protection for
both countries and commodities. Figures 5a and 5b
display the commodity mean and median combina-
tions for North America and the EU. Both regions
have a small number of commodities with tariffs above
the global average: meats, dairy, sugar (EU only), and
tobacco products (North America only). EU tariffs on
fresh meat and dairy have a higher median value indi-
cating that a larger percentage of the tariff lines have
high tariffs. Comparison of the two charts also shows
that both countries have a large number of commodity
categories with average tariffs of 20 percent or less,
although North America has the largest number.
Although no charts are included for the Asia-Pacific
region, examination of data for this region shows a
similar pattern to North America and the EU with the
highest levels of protection applied selectively, within
a commodity grouping. A different pattern emerges 
for Central and South America, where tariff means are
clustered in a smaller range. Many countries in the
Central and South America region also show tariff
medians that are at levels comparable to the means,
suggesting that tariffs are not skewed by a large num-
ber of megatariffs. In non-EU Western Europe, and in
in developing countries, high levels of protection 
tend to be specified more broadly across commodity
groups. 
Differences in the profile of tariffs across countries for
dairy compared to fruits are shown in figures 5c and
5d. All but two average tariffs for dairy (South Amer-
ica and Southern Africa) are above the global mean. In
addition, the median for each region is close to the
mean, indicating that high tariffs exist across most
lines. The fruits chart (figure 5d) encompasses six
commodity categories and contains more observations
than dairy (figure 5c), which is a single commodity
category. The means and medians show a different pat-
tern of protection where most tariffs are below the
global average and median values lie close to the
mean. However, the scatter plot detects the presence of
high tariffs, including points in the high mean/low
median quadrant that indicate megatariffs that likely
isolate domestic industries from international competi-
tion—for example, juice in Eastern Europe, and fresh
and dried fruit in the Middle East. The high tariffs in
the high mean/high median quadrant represent ceiling
bindings for Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. 16 ✺ 		
				 / AER-796 Economic Research Service/USDA
Tariff Rate Quotas
On the surface, TRQs pose a paradox in that they cover
only 6 percent or a small set of tariff-lines and are used
by only 35 of 113 countries in this study, but are per-
ceived to play an important role in agricultural protec-
tion. TRQs began as an instrument to provide limited
market access for sensitive commodities because coun-
tries were worried that tariffication in the URAA would
lead to extremely high tariffs. The use of TRQs in most
regions makes them a factor in trade around the globe.
TRQs were scheduled by countries in all regions
reviewed in this report except for South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa. Table 3 lists the countries that use
TRQs, and these countries include the largest agricul-
tural importing members of the WTO. Appendix tables
1 and 2 contain average tariffs by region and by chapter
of the harmonized system and show that TRQs exist
across all commodity groups.
Some notable differences across TRQs show that while
the problem touches most regions and commodities,
the role of TRQs varies significantly. Some regions,
such as Eastern Europe, scheduled TRQs for products
in most commodity groups (see appendix tables 1 and
2). A more common practice was to schedule TRQs
for a subset of specific, narrowly defined commodities
or sub-commodities. Looking across commodities, in
all regions with TRQs, at least one country scheduled
TRQs for meats; dairy; cereals; and preparations of
vegetables, fruits, nuts, or other parts of plants. The
prevalence of TRQs in the sensitive sectors of meats,
dairy, and cereals provides at least a partial explana-
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High Tariffs Characterize TRQs
Many of the high over-quota tariffs for TRQs appear to
reflect countries’ objectives to protect sensitive agri-
cultural sectors. The average over-quota tariff for TRQ
lines is 128 percent (table 3). The average over-quota
tariff for 25 of the countries is higher than the 62-per-
cent average for all tariffs. Of this group, the average
over-quota tariff of 8 countries is between 100 and 150
percent. Over-quota rates of 6 countries are between
150 and 250 percent, and 2 countries, Japan and
Korea, schedule over-quota rates that average above
300 percent. 
At 63 percent, the average in-quota tariff equals
approximately the overall average tariff of 62 percent.
In general, WTO members scheduled in-quota tariff
rates at less than 50 percent. However, eight WTO
members set in-quota tariffs over the global average
tariff of 62 percent: Norway, Morocco, Barbados,
Colombia, Malaysia, Israel, Switzerland, and Indone-
sia. Of this group, most scheduled in-quota tariffs
between 65-150 percent. Although in-quota tariffs
were designed to provide market access for a limited
quantity of imports at relatively low tariffs, table 3 
shows that, in practice, in-quota tariffs were also
scheduled at very high levels.9
The ratio of the average tariff for all tariff-lines com-
pared with the average for only the over-quota TRQ
lines supports the expectation that TRQs generally pro-
tect sensitive sectors. Figure 6 shows the ratio of the
average tariff for all lines to the average tariff for over-
quota TRQ lines.  In 14 countries, the average tariff for
the TRQ lines is at least twice that for all lines. Three
countries stand out with rates more than six times that
of the average for all lines. Australia, with one of the
overall lowest tariff averages, has a small number of
TRQs that protect the dairy sector. Canada’s TRQs pro-
tect mainly the dairy and poultry sectors and have an
average over-quota tariff of 139 percent, although very
low in-quota tariffs. Not surprising, with the highest
average over-quota rate at 388 percent, Japan’s over-
quota rate is seven times higher than its overall aver-
age. While potentially posing a barrier to its markets,
Japan’s in-quota average of 22 percent represents a
small fraction of the over-quota rate.
9 See analysis in Burfisher et al., for analysis of administration of
TRQs and the possible role of in-quota tariffs.








































  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
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Summing Up Tariff Protection:
OECD vs. Non-OECD
Indicators of tariff protection for OECD and non-
OECD countries in table 4 complement the characteri-
zation of tariffs using means and medians. The first
four columns show averages for the commodity cate-
gories in absolute terms (table 4, columns 1 and 2) 
and as a percentage of the global mean tariff (table 4,
columns 3 and 4). The data reinforce the finding that
protection in OECD countries is concentrated in a 
few sectors: grains, dairy, livestock, sugar, and sweet-
eners. Non-OECD countries have overall high rates 
of protection with less variation across commodity
groupings. They have high protection on the same
commodities as OECD countries, but tobacco stands
out with the highest average tariff for non-OECD
countries. 
The number of countries with tariffs higher than the
global average shows the prevalence of high tariffs
across countries. As in other cuts of the data, dairy
stands out with the highest mean in OECD countries.
Dairy also has the largest number of OECD and third
largest number of non-OECD countries with high
means. Sweeteners and frozen meat also have high
means across a large number of countries. 
OECD countries use megatariffs in a limited number
of commodity groups, but have TRQs in all but two
commodity groups. The concentration of megatariffs
among the familiar sensitive sectors is another mani-
festation of high protection for a few (albeit large) sec-
tors. The number of TRQs notified by OECD countries
is also concentrated in a few sectors. However, TRQs
are found in at least one region for most commodity
groups, indicating that sensitive products exist across
the agricultural sector.
Non-OECD countries rely on megatariffs for protec-
tion along with more selective application of TRQs.
Non-OECD, or developing countries, often apply tar-
iffs far below these high, bound rates. The following
section examines the use of applied tariffs in develop-
ing countries. 
Overall, different patterns of protection between
OECD and non-OECD countries emerge. OECD coun-
tries have higher rates on “traditional” agricultural sec-
tors, such as dairy, livestock, and sugar, while non-
OECD countries have high tariffs across most com-
modities. Both OECD and non-OECD countries pro-
vide extremely high protection to a few commodities.
However, as a result of tariffication, OECD countries
apply more TRQs than non-OECD countries. Non-
OECD countries use megatariffs more than OECD
countries. Many of the megatariffs associated with
developing countries were not subject to reduction
under the Uruguay Round because they were estab-
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Comparison of Bound and
Applied Tariffs
As shown in the preceding sections, many WTO mem-
bers maintain high bound tariffs in their WTO market
access schedules. In practice, however, not all coun-
tries apply tariffs at the bound rate (see box page 8,
Bound Tariffs, TRQ Tariffs, and Applied Tariffs: What’s
the Difference?). Latin American countries present a
good example of this, partly because of data availabil-
ity. Figure 7 compares final WTO bound tariffs with
1998 applied tariffs for 15 countries, 12 of which are
in Latin America. The final bound tariff for these
countries is the tariff binding to be effective no later
than 2004. In all cases, the average 1998 applied tariff
is considerably lower than the final 2004 WTO bound
rate. The average bound tariff for the 12 countries is
45 percent, while the average applied tariff in 1998
was 13 percent, or less than one-third the level of the
average bound tariff. Not only do they tend to be
lower, there is also less dispersion across applied tar-
iffs than corresponding bound rates. While the average
bound tariffs of these countries range rather widely,
from 26 to 110 percent, the average applied tariff in
1998 fell within a much lower and narrower range of
10 to 43 percent. 
For developing countries in other regions, a more lim-
ited set of applied tariff data for one or more of the
years 1995-99 was available. Table 5 presents these
tariff averages. For 7 of the countries listed, applied
tariffs for the various years reported were at levels that
averaged from about one-quarter to about three-quar-
ters of the bound rates. India, Pakistan, and Tunisia all
scheduled final bound tariffs which average over 100
percent, while the applied tariffs for the years shown
were considerably lower, at between 30 and 43 per-
cent. Korea and Morocco, however, set applied tariffs
for the years listed at about 75 percent of bound rates.
Although the countries listed above apply tariffs below
bound rates, many developing countries and most
developed countries tend to apply tariffs at the bound
rate. Some countries, such as Thailand and Turkey,
appear to be violating their Uruguay Round commit-
ments by applying tariffs at rates higher than their
bound rates, but this is explained by the fact that many




























  Bound tariffs are MFN rates based on final URAA implementation, and applied tariffs represent annual average.
Source:  Economic Research Service, USDA
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of their bound tariffs are not scheduled to become
effective until 2004. The applied rates, on the other
hand, reflect the tariff schedule published for Thailand
in 1995 and Turkey in 1997, well before full imple-
mentation of all tariff reductions.
The differences between bound and applied rates
reflect a conflicting set of interests of importers and
governments. The lower tariffs provided by applied
rates in the examples shown in figure 7 may be prefer-
able for importers seeking to import and sell foreign
goods. However, given the ability of governments to
raise applied rates without penalty, the tariff applied on
a shipment when it clears customs may not be the tariff
published in the country’s applied tariff schedule. This
uncertainty can have a dampening effect on the level of
additional trade one might expect to occur at the lower
applied rate. On the other hand, from the government’s
perspective, the lower applied rates give the country the
ability to raise tariffs quickly in order to insulate its
domestic market from fluctuations in world prices and
thus minimize harm to the national economy. Unfortu-
nately, when countries utilize high bound tariffs as an
umbrella under which they vary their applied tariffs,
they can eliminate much of the advantage that stable,
bound tariffs have over nontariff barriers and can con-
tribute toward greater instability in world prices.
*+$




 %$ %4 

E
@ 46 %$ %$ %$ %4 %4
 
 96 %8 %7 %7 %8 ''

0





 ': %8 
 %7 %7 %:
.
#
 7% %7 

























3 74 %7 


































 %% %$ 

































 %$ %4 

=@
 8' %8 






















				 / AER-796 Economic Research Service/USDA
Tariff Escalation
Tariff escalation refers to the situation where tariffs are
zero or low on primary products and then increase, or
escalate, as the product undergoes additional process-
ing. Further, when tariffs on products escalate with the
stage of processing, the effective rate of protection, or
the tariff expressed as fractions of value-added after
deducting intermediate inputs from product value, also
increases. Thus, tariff escalation potentially signals
high rates of protection for value-added or processed
products, and can inhibit international trade in these
goods. For a few countries, however, the opposite may
occur, with higher tariffs on bulk commodities raising
raw material costs, thus placing a country’s processed
exports at a competitive disadvantage to other coun-
tries, a situation known as tariff de-escalation.
The commodity breakouts presented in table 2 identify
a number of primary and processed commodity stages,
albeit at a somewhat aggregate level. To give some
indication of the extent to which tariffs escalate in the
agricultural sector, table 6 shows various processing
stages for a number of commodity groupings and gives
the mean tariff by region. 
A number of important points emerge from table 6.
First, although there is evidence of tariff escalation in
a number of commodities across both developed and
developing regions, there are also many regions and
commodities in which tariff escalation does not appear
to be a problem. In 7 of the 13 regions, tariffs on
processed products exceed those on the raw material in
more than half of the cited examples. Tariff escalation
is most evident in the schedules of Eastern Europe and
the Middle East, followed by North America, South
Asia, and the EU. In Eastern Europe, tariffs tend to
escalate by at least 10 percentage points in all but
three processing chains. The largest example of escala-
tion, however, is for sweeteners in North Africa, where
the mean tariff increases by over 100 percentage points
over those on sugar beets and sugarcane. 
Processed products in which escalation is most pro-
nounced include meats, sweeteners, and vegetable oils.
Tariffs increase with processing in 10 regions within
the meats and sweeteners sectors and in 9 regions
within the vegetable oils sector. In some cases (meat in
Southern Africa and Other Western Europe and veg-
etable oils and sweeteners in North Africa), the aver-
age spread between primary and processed commodity
tariffs is over 50 percentage points. Other examples of
spreads exceeding 50 percentage points include veg-
etable juice in Eastern Europe and tobacco products in
North America.
Tariffs in some processing chains do not increase and
may even decline with additional processing. The
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean
tend to have uniform tariffs across all agricultural
products and account for the bulk of the cases where
no change occurs across the processing chain. The
hides and skins sector provides the best example of
tariff de-escalation, or tariff protection declining with
processing. In 9 of the 13 regions, the average tariff on
hides and skins declines compared with the average on
live animals. Other studies of tariff escalation suggest
that tariff de-escalation is particularly common in the
case of multiple outputs (Lindland). Thus, while tariffs
on hides and skins are lower than those on live ani-
mals, the tariff on meat, the main output in this multi-
ple processing relationship, tends to be much higher. A
pattern of tariff de-escalation can also result when the
processed import is at the first stage of processing. In
this case, tariffs on the finished product (in our exam-
ple, leather goods) would then escalate. In agriculture,
a pattern of tariff de-escalation might be tied to the
level of support provided by farm programs, which, to
be effective, might require high border protection on
primary products. In some of these cases, however,
products at a higher level of processing may receive
protection in forms other than tariffs, such as higher
transport costs or the ability of domestic firms to exer-
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Agricultural Tariff Schedules of
the United States, European
Union, and Japan
This section presents a more detailed examination of
the agricultural tariff schedules for three of the world’s
largest importers of agricultural goods, the United
States, the EU, and Japan. These schedules are among
the most complex in the world, consisting of a mix of
tariffs and TRQs, with a combination of ad valorem
and non-ad valorem rates. Some of the rates vary over
the course of the year. Some are set on the basis of a
complex technical relationship, while others are a
combination of ad valorem and specific rates, set up so
that either component can be binding. This section
provides a detailed picture, on a commodity basis, of
where bound tariffs in each country’s schedule remain
high and where they are already low or zero. 
Measuring the Impact of High Tariffs
Figure 8 consists of three histograms containing the
proportion of each country’s tariff-lines falling in 6
categories ranging from zero (duty-free) tariffs to tar-
iffs greater than 100 percent. This breakout illustrates
that there are both widespread differences in the distri-
bution of agricultural tariffs across the three countries
and that none of the countries’ tariff schedules are dis-
tributed symmetrically around the tariff mean. Distrib-
utions such as these are described as being highly
skewed to the right, meaning that the tariffs continue
much farther to the right of the mean than to the left.
This is somewhat obscured by the fact that, in figure 8,
all tariffs above 100 percent are lumped into one inter-
val on the far right of each distribution. About 2 per-
cent (24 tariff-lines) of the U.S. schedule consists of
tariffs above 100 percent, with the highest rate equal-
ing 350 percent. For the EU the figures are 8 percent
(141 lines) with a high rate of over 500 percent, while
11 percent (142 lines) of Japan’s schedule is made 
up of megatariffs, with the highest rate exceeding
2,000 percent. 
As shown in figure 8, the means for each of these
countries are clearly inflated by the presence of a rela-
tively small number of very high rates. As discussed
previously, for skewed distributions, the mean alone is
not sufficient to characterize the overall level of tariffs.
Medians provide a useful complement since they are
robust to outliers. In each case, the tariff medians are
considerably lower than the tariff means. In contrast to
the median, which defines the center of the distribution
in each country’s tariff schedule, only 12 percent of
Japan’s agricultural tariffs are larger than its tariff
mean. Only 21 percent of U.S. tariffs are greater than
the mean, while in the EU’s schedule only 28 percent
of all tariffs exceed the mean. 





























  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
Source:  Economic Research Service, USDA
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The mean, median, and frequency of distribution give
a more complete picture of each country’s agricultural
tariff schedule as well as additional information useful
when comparing tariff schedules across countries.
Judging from these measures, the overall level of tariff
protection in the EU and Japan is considerably higher
than in the United States. But the picture is not as
clear when comparing the EU and Japan, since the rel-
ative size of their tariff means and medians differs,
with the EU having a lower mean but a higher median.
What is clear, though, is the extent to which each
country’s tariff mean is inflated by the presence of
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Finding Megatariffs by Commodity Groupings
This section focuses on how agricultural tariffs differ
across commodity sectors and identifies which products
are subject to high tariffs that might preclude profitable
trade from taking place. Figures 9-11 display the tariff
means for the same 46 commodity groupings used in the
previous section, comparing these means with the overall
tariff mean for each country.10 The individual commod-
ity means exceed the country’s overall mean in only
between 10 (U.S.) and 14 (EU) of the 46 product cate-
gories in each country. In seven of the commodity 
sectors in Japan and in one each in the United States 
and the EU the means are greater than or equal to
100 percent.
In addition to containing the means found in figures 9-
11, table 7 gives the tariff medians for these commod-
ity groups and identifies the extent to which megatar-
iffs are being applied in each group. Large differences
between the mean and median tariffs indicate that a
few, extremely high rates distort the mean. Megatariffs
are found in between 7 (U.S.) and 17 (EU and Japan)
of the 46 product categories in each country. It is 
interesting to note where the differences and similari-
ties lie in the levels of tariff protection each country
accords its agricultural and agri-food producers 
and how these compare with the overall level of 
tariff protection.
10 Recall that these groupings represent a subset of all the agricul-
ture tariffs in the countries’ schedules.  Some of the missing lines
represent sectors where tariff equivalents cannot be calculated,
e.g., alcoholic beverages.
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U.S. average agricultural tariff (12 percent)
1
  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
So rce: Economic Research Service, USDA
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The highest mean tariffs in the United States are the
result of some very high duties levied on imports of
tobacco products and unmanufactured tobacco. Even
though most of the tariffs in these categories are below
10 percent, the means are inflated by the presence of
seven megatariffs (all equal to 350 percent), each of
which is an over-quota rate in a TRQ. The mean tariff
on products in the sweeteners category is also high.
While it contains only two megatariffs (on glucose and
fructose imports), a large proportion of the duties in
this category exceed 50 percent. All of these high tar-
iffs form the over-quota rates of a TRQ. A high mean
and median, as well as the largest number of megatar-
iffs, are found in the dairy sector. The seven mega-
tariffs in this category apply to the imports of dairy
products other than cheese or butter (including milk
and cream, yogurt, and sour cream). Similar to sweet-
eners, the high median indicates that most of the other
rates in the dairy group are also fairly high (over 65
percent of all dairy tariffs are above 30 percent). All of
these high dairy tariffs are the over-quota rates of a
TRQ. Other commodity groups with means above the
overall average include cocoa beans and products,
feeds (oilmeals, pellets, and other feeding residues),
food preparations (including sauces, soups, and condi-
ments), oilseeds, and tree nuts. The oilseeds category
contains two of the highest tariffs in the U.S. schedule,
on shelled and unshelled peanuts, but generally low
tariffs across all other oilseeds, and thus has a mean of
only 17 percent. All 24 of the megatariffs in the U.S. 
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EU average agricultural tariff (30 percent)
1
  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
Source:  Economic Research Service, USDA
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schedule form the over-quota tariff in a TRQ, so some
market access is being provided at the lower in-
quota rates. 
The EU’s highest tariff rates affect mainly products in
the dairy and meat sectors. Of the EU’s 141 megatar-
iffs, 70 percent are found in these product categories.
In the dairy sector, megatariffs are applied on almost
all items with the exception of cheeses, while most of
the meat megatariffs apply to the imports of beef,
lamb/mutton, and goat meat. While the means are
somewhat inflated by the presence of these high rates,
overall the tariffs in both sectors tend to be high, with
78 percent of dairy tariffs and 57 percent of meat 
tariffs bound above 30 percent. Most of the meat
megatariffs form the over-quota portion of a tariff-rate
quota (TRQ), so there might be some possibility of
market access at the lower in-quota rate. However,
with the exception of some TRQs for butter, the high
dairy tariffs are not associated with a TRQ, thus these
tariffs would apply on all imports. Other commodity
sectors with high mean tariffs include sugar beet, sugar
cane, sweeteners, grains, grain products, and prepared
feeds. Most of these categories also have high median
tariffs, since a large proportion of the tariffs in these
categories are quite high. The maximum EU tariff is
540 percent, applied to imports of dried or powdered
sugar beets (which contributes to the high average for
sugar beets in figure 10). Some other product lines
affected by megatariffs include grape juice, prepared
or preserved mushrooms, and bananas. 
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  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
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Among Japan’s 142 tariff-lines subject to rates in
excess of 100 percent are 49 of the 50 highest bound
tariffs found within the three countries. The highest
commodity tariff mean is that for dairy products, with
an average of 322 percent. Megatariffs account for 63
percent of all tariff-lines in the dairy sector, with 20 of
these rates exceeding 500 percent. The median tariff of
227 indicates how high the bulk of tariffs are in this
sector. As with the EU, all dairy imports, with the
exception of cheese, are protected by megatariffs.
Unlike the EU, however, most of these rates form the
over-quota tariff of a TRQ. Imports of dried legumes
are also subject to TRQs with very high over-quota
rates and are the reason why the mean on dried vegeta-
bles of 197 is so high. The means on the grains, 191,
and grain products, 162, are also very high, largely a
result of Japan’s having recently tariffied its protection
on the imports of rice and rice products. Tariffs on
individual tariff lines in these three groups include 43
megatariffs, nine of which range from 710 percent to
1,364 percent on various categories of rice. The pro-
duction of starches is also a highly protected industry
in Japan, with tariffs averaging 126 percent. The live
animals category has a very high average tariff, but a
zero median tariff. Imports of certain breeds of horses,
buffalo, and swine are subject to megatariffs, while
imports of all other animals in this category are per-
mitted duty-free entry. A large number of megatariffs
are also applied on imports of meats and sweeteners.
The highest Japanese tariff, of over 2,000 percent, is
applied to imports of konnyaku (konjac) tubers, a
product found in the other vegetables category. 
Existing Low or Zero Tariffs
While high tariff rates affect several products in the
United States, EU, and Japan, some product groups
face zero or very low tariffs. In particular, skins and
hides, certain fibers (cotton, wool, flax, and hemp), a
wide range of horticultural products, dried fruit, cof-
fee, tea, and essential oils tend to enter each country
duty-free or at a very low duty. 
If low tariff rates are defined as those below 10 per-
cent (single digits), then the corresponding proportion
of low agricultural tariff-lines is equal to 76 percent in
the U.S. schedule, 50 percent in Japan, and 43 percent
in the EU. Thirty-four of the 46 commodity groupings
in the U.S. tariff schedule have average tariffs at or
below 10 percent, while 18 in Japan and 14 in the EU
fall into this category. In many cases, these low tariffs
are applied to raw materials, with the corresponding
processed products subject to higher rates. Grains and
oilseeds are generally subject to lower tariff rates than
their products in the United States and Japan; the tar-
iffs on live animals are less than those on meats in the
United States and the EU, and raw tobacco faces lower
tariffs than tobacco products in all three countries.
This suggests that there are a number of incidences of
tariff escalation in these countries, although the evi-
dence should be interpreted with caution, given the
aggregate level of the analysis. 
Summing Up United States, EU, and 
Japan Comparisons
Prohibitive tariffs block trade in many agricultural
products, particularly in Japan and the EU. The exis-
tence of triple-digit tariffs alongside zero tariffs illus-
trates the extremes that characterize the distribution.
The analysis identifies product categories with
megatariffs that could block trade and highlights dif-
ferences between means and medians that indicate
where a few, highly protected products have a distort-
ing effect on the average rate of protection. 
Across commodity groupings, broad similarities exist
in the level and distribution of tariff protection within
countries. The results demonstrate that, while the tar-
iffs most critical for protection of the domestic agricul-
tural sector might differ somewhat by country, they
generally are only a subset of the country’s total agri-
cultural tariff schedule. Dairy and sugar products are
highly protected in all three countries, while hides and
skins and fibers are almost free of protection. On the
other hand, levels of protection vary greatly among
some commodities in all three countries for various
reasons. Japan applies high tariffs on raw silk and silk
cocoon imports, while they enter the United States and
EU at zero or minimal duties. Because of its proximity
to neighboring sugar beet producing countries, the EU
applies a high tariff on sugar beet imports, while the
United States and Japan allow sugar beets duty-free
entry, relying instead on high transport costs to pro-
vide protection to producers. The United States
imposes its highest tariffs on tobacco and tobacco
products, which Japan imports duty-free and the EU at
relatively low duties. 30 ✺ 		
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Tariffs on Commodities of
Export Interest to the 
United States
In 1999, U.S. agricultural exports totalled almost $53
billion, spread across more than 130 countries. The
existence of import tariffs in these countries was one
of several factors affecting the size of this trade. Tariffs
alter the relative prices of imported and domestically
produced goods and thus alter the volume of imports.
How much greater would U.S. agricultural exports be
if global agricultural tariffs were eliminated or sub-
stantially reduced? This is a question not easily
answered, as it is subject to a host of factors, including
producer and consumer responses to price changes,
market structures, and time lags in the adjustment
process. While the answer is beyond the scope of this
study, some insight can be gained by identifying those
markets in which U.S. agricultural exports continue to
face high tariffs.
Main Agricultural Products Exported 
by the United States 
The top 30 categories of U.S. agricultural exports are
shown in table 8. For the countries reviewed in this
report, these items earned $32.7 billion, or about 62
percent of total U.S. agricultural export revenue in
1999. Of these, the top 10 each accounted for at least
$1 billion in revenue and include the traditional bulk
commodities: corn, soybeans, wheat, and tobacco, as
well as intermediate goods such as beef (fresh/chilled
and frozen), frozen chicken cuts, and soymeal. Also
included in the top 10 are two consumer-oriented cate-
gories: cigarettes and miscellaneous food preparations.
The top 30 destinations for these U.S. agricultural
exports are also shown in table 8. The countries listed
are a subset of the countries reviewed in this report,
which accounted for 86 percent of the $32.7 billion
U.S. exports attributed to these 30 categories.11 The
top 30 countries alone accounted for $26.4 billion, or
81 percent. Japan was by far the most important desti-
nation for the U.S. commodities making up these 30
categories, with imports of over $7.6 billion. The EU,
Mexico, Korea, and Canada represented billion dollar
markets for these commodities. In terms of both com-
modities and countries, there is a high degree of con-
centration at the top. The top ten commodity group-
ings account for 71 percent of the $32.7 billion subto-
tal, while the top ten destinations for this trade account
for 68 percent.
Also contained in table 8 are the top 30 markets for
the top 30 U.S. agricultural exports. In 1999, the
United States registered exports worth $14.8 billion to
these markets. A large share of the markets for these
U.S. exports is found in Japan and the EU. The single
most lucrative export destination for U.S. agriculture is
associated with import demand for cigarettes by Japan.
Other billion dollar markets for U.S. exporters in 1999
resulted from import demand for corn in Japan and
soybeans in the EU. Rounding out the top five were
the Japanese markets for soybeans and fresh and
chilled beef. The sixth largest market for U.S.
exporters (soybeans to Mexico) was one of eight
NAFTA markets listed in table 8. U.S. exports of soy-
beans, wheat, corn, sorghum, fresh and chilled beef,
and cotton to Mexico and bread, pastries, etc., and 
miscellaneous food preparations to Canada were
among our top 30 export markets in 1999 (for the top
30 categories). 
It is informative to compare the level of tariffs in those
markets that imported U.S. products with those that
did not. While most U.S. exports to Mexico and
Canada would have been subject to preferential, and 
in some cases, zero tariffs, U.S. exports to some other
markets were constrained by very high tariffs, in 
some cases high enough to preclude any trade from
taking place.
Exports Subject to Megatariffs
Figure 12 displays the mean and upper bound tariffs
facing U.S. exporters, for each of the top 30 U.S. agri-
cultural exports.12 To better illustrate the means, the
upper bounds have been cut off at 500 percent. The
simple means range from 47 percent for mixed feeds
to 98 percent for frozen beef. Also shown is the global
tariff mean of 62 percent. As might be expected, these
means are inflated by a few very high tariffs in some
countries. Note, in particular, that ten of the categories
(corn, sorghum, rice, tobacco, frozen beef, frozen
potatoes, apples, wine, whiskey, and miscellaneous
food preparations) are subject to at least one tariff in
excess of 500 percent. This section focuses on those
markets where U.S. exports continue to face tariff
11 Of the remaining trade, two-thirds went to just four of the coun-
tries not currently WTO members, and therefore not reviewed in
this report: Taiwan, China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia.
12 Consistent with previous sections, the means are simple averages
and do not include the in-quota rates of TRQ’s.Economic Research Service/USDA 		
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peaks, defined here as being synonymous with
megatariffs, or tariffs equal to or greater than 
100 percent.
Table 9 summarizes, for each of the top U.S. export
categories, selected characteristics of the markets
where this trade faces megatariffs.13 In these 30 com-
modity categories, 47 different countries have at least
one tariff bound at 100 percent or above. Twenty-five
of these countries have bound their entire agricultural
schedules at rates equal to or above 100 percent. For
the remainder, megatariffs are found in between 1
(India, Malaysia, Morocco, and Thailand) and 17
(Norway) of the 30 commodity categories. Across cat-
egories, the two beef groupings, frozen and fresh/
chilled boneless beef, top the list, with U.S. exports 
of these products subject to megatariffs in 36 and 37
countries, respectively. 
Eleven of these markets (wine and whiskey exports to
Egypt; unprocessed tobacco to Malaysia; frozen beef
to Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland; milled rice to
Japan; apples to Israel; and corn, sorghum, and miscel-
laneous food preparations to South Korea) are subject
to at least one tariff above 500 percent. In eight of
these cases, however, the tariff is the over-quota rate of
a TRQ, so there is some opportunity for exports at the
lower in-quota rate. In most cases, the within-quota
tariff is significantly below the over-quota megatariff,
13 Appendix table 3 lists these markets, the tariffs faced by U.S.
agricultural exports, and the value of U.S. exports.  Not included
in this list are those countries that bound tariffs at 100 precent or
above, but where available data indicated that they were applying
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and U.S. product is being imported (see appendix 
table 3).
The value of U.S. exports to markets where megatar-
iffs exist totalled $3.8 billion in 1999, an average of
about $4.4 million per market. This compares with an
average trade flow of $11.2 million per destination to
all other markets in this report for these 30 commodi-
ties. The difference between those markets where
some access was offered via a TRQ versus those
where no TRQ was in effect was dramatic. U.S.
exports to TRQ markets totalled $2.2 billion, an aver-
age of $35.6 million per market. When one excludes
markets where a TRQ exists, average U.S. exports
drop to under $2 million per market. This suggests
that, in those markets subject to megatariffs, TRQs are
offering some market access for U.S. imports,
although one must also keep in mind that most of the
TRQs tend to be in the wealthier OECD countries.
Japan, the EU, and Korea represent the three most
important non-NAFTA destinations for these 30 U.S.
commodities. In 1999, U.S. exports to Japan of the
four commodities (wheat, rice, fresh and chilled pork,
and miscellaneous food preparations) where megatar-
iffs were levied, averaged $244 million, versus average
exports of $256 million to the 26 other markets. U.S.
exports to the four EU markets subject to megatariffs
(frozen boneless beef, rice, mixed feeds, and residues
of starch manufacture) averaged $133 million versus
$145 million to the others. Korea applies megatariffs
in five of these markets (corn, sorghum, soybeans, for-
age, and miscellaneous food preparation). U.S. exports
averaged $173 million to these markets versus $45
million to the other 25. For these three countries, at
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630 754 1,203 877
Line represents range for tariff with the top being
the maximum and bottom being the minimum.
Note:  All minimums are 0.
Global average 
Product average
779 756 3,000 553 554 3,000
1
  Tariffs are bound MFN rates based on final URAA implementation.
Source:  Economic Research Service, USDA
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least, the presence of megatariffs in a market did not
result in U.S. exports being significantly less than in
markets where megatariffs were not being applied.
There are several explanations for this situation. In
most of the markets where megatariffs are found in
these countries, we also find TRQs being applied.
With the exception of the Japanese rice TRQ, all have
fairly low in-quota rates, and the minimum access
amounts in most of these markets are being filled or
close to being filled. 
Another explanation has to do with the fact that these
exports are for all products within these 6-digit cate-
gories. In many cases, megatariffs might be applied on
some of the sub-categories of these products while
other sub-categories are subject to zero or very low
tariffs. One example might be a low tariff on corn used
as seed, but a high tariff on corn destined for use as
food or feed. In the case of some perishable products,
tariffs vary over the course of the year, with high tar-
iffs when the product is in season and low ones during
the rest of the year. The value of imports may be very
high during the time the tariff is low and drop to zero
when the megatariffs are in effect. The result is that it
can be difficult to have a clear vision of the effect that
high tariffs are having on trade, particularly if tariffs
and trade are not compared at the same HS level. One
thing that is evident, however, is that the wide range in
tariffs levied on individual commodities within a num-
ber of these 6-digit commodity markets (see appendix
table 3) indicates the extent to which countries have
strategically tailored their tariff schedules to provide
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Conclusions
While this report has focused on relative relationships
among tariffs across countries and commodities, in
each slice of the data a story of high tariffs emerged.
With the global average tariff estimated at 62 percent,
it is not surprising that high tariffs characterize most
countries’ agricultural schedules. Only in a very few
cases was a country’s agricultural tariff average close
to the industrial country 5-percent average for tariffs
on imports of manufactures (e.g., the average agricul-
tural tariff for Australia). Given the high level of 
protection that high tariffs allow, current (Burfisher et
al.) analysis shows that tariffs contribute the largest
share of the cost of current agricultural protection and,
thus, should be a priority for the next round of trade
negotiations. 
Across regions and countries, a few stand out with
high average levels of protection. Mean agricultural
tariffs are over 100 percent in South Asia (113 percent)
and the non-EU countries of Western Europe (104 per-
cent). In Africa, average tariffs for the Sub-Saharan
and northern regions range from 71 to 75 percent. The
average rate in Central America is about 54 percent,
followed by Eastern Europe, where the average tariff is
49 percent. Tariffs in the EU, Asia-Pacific, and South
America range between 30 and 39 percent. At 25 per-
cent, North America registered the lowest regional tar-
iff average. The large differences in average tariffs
across countries indicate the potential for farmers in
one country to benefit from protection while reducing
prices and incomes of farmers in other countries.
Across commodities, tobacco, meat, dairy, sugar, and
sweetener products generally have the highest tariffs.
For other commodities, high protection may exist in
selective countries. For example, in some regions, such
as Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East, compar-
atively high tariffs within each respective region are
recorded for several categories of prepared vegetables.
For these commodities, the global profile of tariffs
indicates that producers in some countries benefit from
high levels of protection at the expense of producers of
those commodities in other countries. 
Megatariffs contribute to, but do not explain, the high
overall tariff averages. Comparisons of means and
medians across countries and commodities uncover
cases where megatariffs largely explain the high mean
or average tariffs for a specific commodity. However,
in many cases similar values of means and medians
indicate uniformly high tariff levels. The overall pic-
ture is one of high tariffs across a large number of
regions, countries, and commodities. 
As might be expected from their relationship with
products previously protected by nontariff barriers,
TRQs are associated with high tariffs and sensitive
sectors. The average over-quota tariff of 128 percent is
slightly more than two times the overall average. This
is a product of the Uruguay Round tariffication
process, which accommodated the conversion of some
base period NTBs into very high tariff equivalents.
These new tariffs were set at such high levels that no
imports, other than those provided by the minimum
access amount, are likely to enter. Both surprising and
contrary to the principle that TRQs should provide
market access is the estimated average in-quota tariff
of 63 percent—slightly above the average of 62 per-
cent for all other tariffs. A number of countries have
bound their in-quota rates at extremely high levels,
even though the process of tariffication called for min-
imum access to be provided “on the basis of a tariff
quota at a low or minimal rate.” While it is true that
no numerical rule defined “low or minimal,” these
rates would seem to contradict the spirit of the 
agreement.
Both developing and developed countries have high
average tariffs, but tariffs for developed countries show
more variation across commodities. Developed coun-
tries’ high tariffs are concentrated in dairy, meats,
sugar, and sweeteners while developing countries pro-
vide more uniform tariffs across commodities. The
method of providing extremely high protection varies
as megatariffs in developed countries often form the
over-quota tariff in a TRQ, while those in developing
countries do not. This suggests that in developed coun-
tries, at least, some market access may be provided at
the generally lower in-quota tariff in those markets
affected by megatariffs. At the same time, we found
that many developing countries levy applied tariffs that
are considerably below the bound rates.
The role of developing countries in future WTO nego-
tiations is likely to increase significantly. A major con-
tribution of this study is the breadth of developing
country coverage, a feature that has generally been
lacking in previous studies of agricultural market
access. While the variation in tariff protection across
developing countries is considerable, our results indi-
cate that bound agricultural tariffs in developing coun-Economic Research Service/USDA 		
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tries are considerably higher, on average, than in
developed countries. This is, in part, a reflection of the
special and differential treatment provided to these
countries, particularly the flexibility provided on ceil-
ing bindings and the lower reduction commitments. 
These results are important for several reasons. First,
they contradict assertions that the Uruguay Round did
not provide reciprocity for developing countries;
specifically, that the mutual concessions agreed to in
agriculture benefitted developed countries at the
expense of developing countries. This assertion is
often accompanied by claims that Uruguay Round
market access concessions have damaged the agricul-
tural sectors in these countries. This view also does not
appear to be supported by the evidence. On the con-
trary, the comparisons between bound and applied
rates, where data on applied tariffs is available, suggest
that much of the market access being provided for
agricultural imports by developing countries is taking
place at rates that are well below their WTO bindings. 
Second, while developing countries continue to face
tariff peaks and tariff escalation in developed country
markets, they also face these problems in trade
between themselves, even perhaps to a greater extent.
As results for the United States, the EU, and Japan
indicate, one-quarter of all tariff-lines in these coun-
tries are duty-free, involving a large number of prod-
ucts of export interest to developing countries. In addi-
tion, the actual tariff rates these countries apply to
imports from individual developing countries are often
lower than the MFN rate would indicate, due to the
existence of the Generalized System of Preferences
which provides for lower rates for selected countries
and commodities, and to other concessions afforded
through various preferential trading arrangements. 
No matter how one views tariff data across countries
and commodities, high average tariffs create barriers to
markets for U.S. and other farmers. The height of the
average tariff signals the need for large cuts to expand
market access broadly in agriculture. In addition, the
presence of megatariffs, particularly those that form
the in-quota rate of a TRQ, points to the need to
aggressively cut tariffs in some sectors if any addi-
tional market access is to be provided.
Finally, our findings have uncovered a number of other
market access issues, beyond simply the high level of
tariffs, which deserve consideration. As already men-
tioned, the complexity of many country tariff sched-
ules makes it very difficult to compare tariffs across
countries and commodities. In particular, matching tar-
iffs and imports is a laborious and cumbersome
process. If tariffs and imports were matched, it would
be easier to approximate ad valorem equivalents for
non-ad valorem tariffs as well as use import weights to
calculate mean tariffs. The former is especially impor-
tant because of the lack of transparency associated
with non-ad valorem tariffs. As already noted, the non-
ad valorem equivalents of these tariffs tend to be
higher than their ad valorem cousins. One of the rea-
sons for this almost certainly derives from their lack of
transparency, which serves to hide the actual level of
protection being provided. The difficulties associated
with deciphering TRQs also bears mentioning. Some
countries scheduled TRQs in ways that require careful
interpretation of each line, and in some cases TRQs
appear to cover a number of overlapping tariff lines.
While these are problems that confront researchers
attempting to unravel the accomplishments of the
Uruguay Round, they must surely have also 
hindered negotiators attempting to assess or quantify
the extent or importance of other countries’ tariff con-
cessions. As such, there would appear to be consider-
able merit in establishing certain rules for imposing
consistency and transparency across tariff schedules. 36 ✺ 		
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In their WTO schedules, members used a variety of
formats and levels of precision to specify individual
tariff commitments. In most cases, members specified
tariffs in ad valorem terms, as a simple percentage of
the value of the imported product. However, some
countries elected to specify some or all tariffs in spe-
cific or other non-ad valorem terms. Tariff Formats
Conceal High Levels of Protection (page 5), presents
two examples of common forms of non-ad valorem
tariffs. Before comparing tariff protection across coun-
tries and commodities, detailed tariff bindings must be
converted into a common format. Calculating ad val-
orem equivalents (AVEs) of specific or other non-ad
valorem tariffs allows aggregation of tariffs across the
widest group of commodities and countries.
Commodity coverage in this report is based on the def-
inition of agriculture as specified in Annex 1 of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (see appendix box,
Product Coverage of the WTO Agreement on Agricul-
ture). This definition includes all items from chapters
1-24 of the Harmonized System (HS), minus chapter 3
(fish and crustaceans). Also included are selected agri-
cultural products from other chapters, such as selected
chemicals, fibers, and other substances. The HS pro-
vides a nomenclature for classifying internationally
traded goods. Each of the chapters listed in Appendix
table 1 is classified at a 2-digit level in the HS. Suc-
cessive levels of disaggregation, found at the 4-, 6-, 8-
or 10-digit levels, define products in narrower and nar-
rower terms, or levels of specificity. 
North America:
Canada, Mexico, United States 
Central America:
Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Panama
South America:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay, Venezuela
Caribbean Islands:
Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint
Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & The




Cyprus, Iceland, Malta, Norway, Switzerland
Eastern Europe:
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia 
Middle East:





Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
South Asia:
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Asia-Pacific:
Australia, Brunei, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Macau, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Solomon
Islands, Thailand
Southern Africa:
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swazi-
land
Countries in Dataset and Regional Groupings
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For example, at the 2-digit, or the HS chapter level, we
find the aggregate category, Meat and Edible Meat
Offal (chapter 2). Chapter 2 is disaggregated into 10
categories at the 4-digit level, ranging from 0201,
Meat of Bovine Animals, Fresh or Chilled, to 0210,
Meat and Edible Meat Offal, Salted, In Brine, Dried or
Smoked; Edible Flours and Meals of Meat or Meat
Offal. Within each 4-digit grouping, a further level of
disaggregation would be at the 6-digit level, for exam-
ple, 020110, Carcasses and Half-carcasses, and
020120, Other Cuts with Bone-in. Up to the 6-digit
level, tariff schedules across countries use the same
categories for breaking out successive commodity dis-
aggregation. Therefore, a 6-digit commodity definition
for a given commodity in one country that uses the HS
would correspond to the same items in another country
using the HS. The definitions of HS commodity group-
ings up to the 6-digit level are established regularly by
the World Customs Organization. 
Tariff schedules of WTO members were specified at
various levels of commodity detail. Thus, some coun-
tries’ schedules have as little as a few hundred individ-
ual tariff-lines, with some of these specified at the 2-
or 4- digit level.1 Other countries specified tariffs at a
10-digit level, which resulted in schedules containing
nearly 2,000 tariff-lines. At 8-digit and higher levels of
disaggregation, commodity definitions vary from
country to country, therefore specific comparisons
across countries are increasingly difficult at that level
of detail.
When a country uses non-ad valorem tariffs, the ability
to compare levels of protection across countries and
commodities is further complicated. A recent paper by
the WTO secretariat, Ad valorem, Specific, and Other
Tariffs, discusses issues raised in the calculation of
AVEs of non-ad valorem tariffs. In order to calculate
AVEs, it is necessary to divide the specific tariff by an
import price. Given the lack of detailed data available
on import prices at the HS level, AVEs were calculated
using world import unit values as a proxy for country-
specific import prices. The world import unit values
were defined at the 6-digit HS level, which, as noted
above, is the most disaggregate level at which tariff
nomenclatures are internationally comparable. Import
unit values were calculated for available world imports
from all sources (minus EU-intra-trade), in value and
volume terms, using global trade data from the United
Nations Trade Data System (COMTRADE). The
import unit values used were for the period 1995-97,
the most recent period available, and were obtained
from the Agricultural Market Access Database. The
world import unit values expressed, where available,
the unit value in U.S. dollars for each 6-digit category,
in kilograms or pieces. For countries that did not
schedule their tariff bindings in U.S. dollars, a final
step prior to calculating the AVEs was to convert the
import unit values, for each year, into national curren-
cies, and then calculate average import unit values for
1995-97, in national currencies.
Tariff schedules of 129 WTO members were reviewed
in this report, yielding a total of about 91,000 individ-
ual tariff lines. Calculations of AVEs were needed for
about 5,600 non-ad valorem tariff lines. Of this total,
AVEs could not be calculated for 387 of the tariff-
1 Some developing countries’ schedules contain a single uniform
tariff rate (such as 100 percent) across all commodities.  In such
cases, a 6-digit tariff schedule for the country was constructed
using the uniform rate across all tariff lines.
Product Coverage of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture (HS96)
HS Chapters 1 to 24 less fish and 
fish products, plus1--
HS Code 2905.43 (mannitol)7
HS Code 2905.44 (sorbitol)
HS Code  2905.45 (glycarol-othre than crude)
HS Heading 33.01 (essential oils)
HS Code (ex) Ex 3302.10 (preparations based on
odoriferous substances, of
a kind used in the manu-
facture of beverage)
HS Headings 35.01 to 35.05 (albuminoidal substances,
modified starches, glues)
HS Code 3809.10 (fishing agents)
HS Heading 3823 (oleochemicals)
HS Code 3824.60 (sorbitol n.e.p.)
HS Headings  41.01 to 41.03 (hides and skins)
HS Heading 43.01 (raw furskins)
HS Headings 50.01 to 50.03 (raw silk and silk waste)
HS Headings 51.01 to 51.03 (wool and animal hair)
HS Headings 52.01 to 52.03 (raw cotton, waste and
cotton carded or combed)
HS Heading 53.01 (raw flax)
HS Heading 53.02 (raw hemp)
%The product descriptions in round brackets are not 
necessarily exhaustive.
Source: WTO Agreement on Agriculture, annex 1.Economic Research Service/USDA 		
				 / AER-796 ✺ 39
lines. The majority (198) of the tariff lines for which
AVEs were not calculated were in chapter 22 of the
HS, which covers beverages, spirits, and vinegar.
Duties on many items in this chapter are specified in
terms of the percentage of alcohol. In these cases, the
tariffs could not be matched to the world import unit
values and, thus, AVEs were not calculated. The next
largest number (95) of the remaining items for which
AVE calculations were not possible pertained to many
of the complex tariffs scheduled by Malaysia on prod-
ucts outside of chapter 22. 
AVEs were calculated at the tariff-line level, whether it
be the 2-, 4-, 6-, 8-, or 10-digit level, but using import
unit values at the 6-digit level. When a tariff was
scheduled at a more disaggregated level, using the
world unit import value could have led to underesti-
mating the AVE for some of these tariffs while overes-
timating it for others. When a tariff was scheduled at
the more aggregate 4-digit level, the price used was a
simple average of all 6-digit import unit values within
each given 4-digit tariff. 
Tariffs used throughout this report, including the AVE
calculations, are the final bound MFN tariffs scheduled
by WTO members. The final tariff bindings reflect the
rate effective after phased implementation of Uruguay
Round tariff cuts. As a general rule, developed coun-
tries phased in their tariff reductions during the period
1995 to 2000. Developing countries began phasing in
their tariff reductions in 1995 as well; however, they
have until 2004 to complete implementation. In cases
where developing countries applied tariffs that were
unbound, they had the flexibility to offer ceiling bind-
ings on these products. These ceiling bindings were
exempt from the reduction commitments; therefore,
the final bound tariff would take effect in 1995. 
Tariff averages are calculated to reflect average MFN
bound tariff rates. These averages are calculated in one
of two ways, depending on whether or not the country
scheduled TRQs. If the country did not schedule
TRQs, all tariff lines in the schedule were used to cal-
culate average tariffs. If the country did schedule
TRQs, the over-quota TRQ rates and all non-TRQ
rates were used to calculate average tariffs. An alterna-
tive in the second case would have been to first com-
pute tariff averages for each TRQ by simply averaging
the in-quota and over-quota rates. The in-quota rates
are not included in this report’s tariff averages since,
as some have argued, using the over-quota rate alone is
more appropriate, because it represents the marginal,
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